Public Choice

Contents of Volume 100 1999

Volume 100, Nos. 1–2

F. van Winden, On the economic theory of interest groups: Towards a group frame of reference in political economics 1–29
D.D. Davis, R.J. Reilly, Rent-seeking with non-identical sharing rules: An equilibrium rescued 31–38
W. Wu, O.A. Davis, The two freedoms, economic growth and development: An empirical study 39–64
T.W. Gilligan, J.G. Matsusaka, Structural constraints on partisan bias under the efficient gerrymander 65–84
D.N. Laband, R.O. Beil, Are economists more selfish than other 'social' scientists? 85–101
J. Adams, Policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting 103–122
D.R. Lee, Lowering the cost of pollution control versus controlling pollution 123–134

Book reviews

Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal, *Congress: A political-economic history of roll call voting* (P.H. Rubin) 135–137
Alberto Alesina and Nouriel Roubini with Gerald D. Cohen, *Political cycles and the macroeconomy* (R.E. Wagner) 137–140
Paul Johnson, *A history of the American people* (C.K. Rowley) 140–149
Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, *Institutions and economic theory: The contribution of the new institutional economics* (R.N. Johnson) 149–152
D. Eric Schansberg, *Poor policy: How government harms the poor* (A. Gifford) 152–156

Volume 100, No. 3–4

Announcement: The Duncan Black Prize iii
R. Boadway, I. Horiba, R. Jha, The provision of public services by government funded decentralized agencies 157–184

A. Basuchoudhary, P. Pecorino, W.F. Shughart II, Reversal of fortune: The politics and economics of the superconducting supercollider 185–201
N. Berggren, Economic freedom and equality: Friends or foes? 203–223
J.A. Jenkins, M. Weidenmier, Ideology, economic interests, and congressional roll-call voting: Partisan instability and Bank of the United States legislation, 1811–1816 225–243
F. Söllner, A note on the political economy of immigration 245–251
S. Fedeli, Competing bureaus and politicians: A compliance approach to the diversion of public funds 253–270
A. Farmer, P. Pecorino, Legal expenditure as a rent-seeking game 271–288
B.A. Abrams, R.F. Settle, Women's suffrage and the growth of the welfare state 289–300
B. Goff, Persistence in government spending fluctuations: Reply to Bohl 301–302

Book reviews
Ronald Wintrobe, *The political economy of dictatorship* (Gordon Tullock) 303–304
Tyler Cowen, *In praise of commercial culture* (Robert B. Ekelund, Jr.) 304–308
John R. Lott, Jr., *More guns, less crime: Understanding crime and gun-control laws* (Bruce L. Benson) 309–313
Calls for papers 315–316
Instructions to authors 317–318
Author index 319
Volume contents 321–322